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LIBRARY 1.14Microsoft 365 Security Library

How to Replace SMS and Voice MFA in Microsoft 365

Text-message and phone-call codes are the weakest MFA methods, and Microsoft is retiring its own SMS and voice delivery in 2027. Here is how to find who still uses them and move everyone to passkeys or the Authenticator app first.

Reviewed by Ali Hassani, C|CISO, CISSP · Last verified November 20, 2026

25+ yearsIT and cybersecurity experience
Certified CISOC|CISO · CISSP · Microsoft · Cisco
Southern CaliforniaBased in Irvine, on-site by appointment
NationwideRemote Microsoft 365 audits

Intelligence Center › Microsoft 365 Security Library › Identity and sign-in

Identity check
Time to fixAbout 1 hour to plan; a few weeks to move everyone
Staff impactMedium: every SMS or voice user registers a new method
LicensingAll plans. Authentication strengths in Conditional Access: Entra ID P1 (Business Premium, E3, E5)
Last verifiedNovember 20, 2026, against Microsoft Learn
Works onBusiness BasicBusiness StandardBusiness PremiumE3E5

Every plan can change which MFA methods are allowed. Requiring a phishing-resistant strength for admins uses Conditional Access, which needs Entra ID P1 (Microsoft Learn).

In one minute

  1. Find everyone whose only MFA method is SMS or voice.
  2. Move administrators to passkeys or security keys first.
  3. Move everyone else to the Authenticator app or a passkey.
  4. Turn off SMS and voice once nobody depends on them.

MFA method strength is part of the identity checks in our Microsoft 365 Security Audit.

What it is

Why SMS and voice are the weakest MFA

A code sent by text message or read out by a phone call proves you have the phone number, not the phone. Anyone who takes over the number, through a SIM swap or by tricking the mobile carrier, gets the codes. Microsoft now says SMS and voice are no longer positioned as secure authentication methods, and recommends phishing-resistant methods such as passkeys, Windows Hello for Business and certificate-based authentication (Microsoft Learn, Microsoft Learn).

Microsoft’s retirement timeline

DateWhat happens
September 1, 2026Passkeys become the default; SMS and voice users are prompted to register one.
February 1, 2027Microsoft-provided SMS and voice retire for all users except Global Administrators and external users. Users with only SMS or voice must register a passkey to sign in.
July 1, 2027The same applies to Global Administrators and external users.

Organizations that truly need SMS can contract a third-party telephony provider through the Microsoft Security Store (Microsoft Learn).

Why it matters

Attackers already know how to get the code

  1. Password stolenPhishing or a reused password.
  2. SIM swap or fake help deskAttacker gets the phone number.
  3. Phishing-resistant MFAThe code is no longer enough.
  4. Code interceptedWithout it: sign-in succeeds.
  5. Admin account taken overWhole tenant at risk.

Drawing: where phishing-resistant MFA breaks the path.

Feb 1, 2027

Microsoft-provided SMS and voice MFA retire for most users.

Source: Microsoft Learn
Jul 1, 2027

the same retirement for Global Administrators and external users.

Source: Microsoft Learn
None

of SMS, voice or Authenticator push count as phishing-resistant in Microsoft’s authentication strengths; passkeys and Windows Hello do.

Source: Microsoft Learn
3

phishing-resistant options most small businesses can use: passkeys in Authenticator, security keys, Windows Hello.

Source: Microsoft Learn

MFA methods, weakest to strongest

MethodPhishing-resistant?Note
SMS or voice callNoOpen to SIM swap; retiring in 2027
Authenticator push or codeNoMuch better than SMS; can be phished or push-bombed
Passkey in AuthenticatorYesPhone-based, works on most devices
FIDO2 security keyYesBest for admins and shared desks
Windows Hello for BusinessYesBuilt into managed Windows PCs

Documented incidents

Advisory · FBI and CISA, AA23-320A

Scattered Spider: SIM swaps and fake help desk calls

The FBI and CISA describe Scattered Spider using phishing, push bombing and SIM swap attacks to get credentials and bypass MFA, posing as IT staff to obtain one-time codes. Their first recommended action is phishing-resistant MFA.

Source: CISA advisory AA23-320A

Update · July 2025

New tactics: talking the help desk into moving MFA

A July 2025 update adds that the group posed as employees to get help desks to reset passwords and move MFA to devices the attackers controlled.

Source: Australian Cyber Security Centre

What we find in audits

What this finding looks like in our audit reports

These are real pages from our published sample reports, written for fictional companies. Click any page to open it full size. The viewer shows the finding, how our Microsoft 365 audit reports MFA strength, the risk and the fix.

Compromise Assessment · Technical ReportSAMPLE · Contoso Ltd is a fictional company1 / 4
Compromise Assessment · Technical Report, Page 27 · Finding F-47: The finding, ready to act on.
The finding, ready to act on. In our compromise assessment sample, two administrators relied on text message or voice call MFA, the weakest methods Microsoft supports.

Your options

What each plan gives you

CapabilityBusiness Basic, StandardBusiness Premium, E3, E5
Choose allowed MFA methods (Authentication methods policy)YesYes
Passkeys, security keys, AuthenticatorYesYes
Registration campaigns to nudge usersYesYes
Require phishing-resistant strength in Conditional AccessNoYes

How to check it yourself

Find who still uses SMS or voice, without changing anything

Filter Methods registered for Mobile phone and look for users with no other method, especially administrators. Then open Policies to see whether SMS and Voice call are enabled.

Read-only PowerShell: users whose only MFA is SMS or voice

Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "AuditLog.Read.All","UserAuthenticationMethod.Read.All"
Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail -All |
  Where-Object { $_.MethodsRegistered -and
    -not ($_.MethodsRegistered | Where-Object { $_ -notin "mobilePhone","alternateMobilePhone","officePhone" }) } |
  Select-Object UserPrincipalName, IsAdmin, MethodsRegistered

The command only reads registration data. Anyone listed will be blocked at sign-in after the retirement date until they register a passkey.

How to configure

How to move users off SMS and voice, step by step

Administrators first

Phishing-resistant MFA for admins

  1. Give each admin a FIDO2 security key or a passkey in Microsoft Authenticator.
  2. In Authentication methods › Policies, enable Passkey (FIDO2) for admins.
  3. Create a Conditional Access policy for admin roles requiring the Phishing-resistant MFA strength, in report-only first.
  4. Exclude your break-glass accounts, check the report, then turn it on.

Everyone else

Move users and switch SMS off

  1. Enable Microsoft Authenticator and Passkey (FIDO2) for all users.
  2. Run a registration campaign so users are prompted to add Authenticator at sign-in.
  3. Re-run the check above until no user has only SMS or voice.
  4. Turn off SMS and Voice call in the Authentication methods policy, or keep them only for a small exception group.
  5. Tell your help desk never to move MFA to a new device without verifying the person.

If you use a custom authentication strength that allows SMS but not passkeys, add passkeys before the retirement date, or users will stay blocked even after registering one (Microsoft Learn).

What your users will notice

A one-time prompt to set up Microsoft Authenticator or a passkey, then a phone notification or face or fingerprint check at sign-in instead of a text message.

How to undo it

Re-enable SMS for a group in the Authentication methods policy. After February 2027 that requires a third-party telephony provider.

Proof and questions

How to prove it is fixed, and what to ask your IT provider

Evidence it is fixed

  • No user has SMS or voice as their only MFA method.
  • Every administrator uses a phishing-resistant method.
  • Admin roles require the phishing-resistant strength in Conditional Access.
  • SMS and voice are off, or limited to a named exception group.

Questions for your IT provider

  • How many of our users still rely on text-message codes?
  • Are we ready for the February 1, 2027 retirement?
  • Which MFA method do our administrators use?
  • How does the help desk verify someone before resetting MFA?
  • Do any custom authentication strengths block passkeys?

Signs it was already abused

If an attacker may have bypassed MFA, look for these signs

Red flags

  • A user suddenly losing mobile service, then a sign-in from a new location.
  • New MFA methods registered on several accounts the same day.
  • Help desk tickets to reset MFA that the user doesn’t remember.
  • Successful sign-ins with SMS from countries you don’t operate in.
  • Security information changes followed by new inbox rules.

If you see these, revoke sessions, reset MFA with in-person or video verification, and keep the logs. Our account takeover investigation establishes what the attacker did, and the Microsoft 365 Evidence Clock shows how long the records are kept.

Framework mapping

Where MFA strength fits

FrameworkWhere it fits
NIST CSF 2.0PR.AA-03: users, services and hardware authenticated
ISO/IEC 27001:2022Annex A 8.5 Secure authentication; 5.17 Authentication information
SOC 2CC6.1 logical access security, including authentication

Reviewed by

Written and reviewed by a practicing CISO

Ali Hassani, CISO and founder of OC Security Audit

Ali Hassani, C|CISO, CISSP

Ali has more than 25 years of IT and cybersecurity experience and holds the Certified CISO and CISSP certifications along with Microsoft and Cisco credentials. He leads every OC Security Audit engagement from Irvine, on-site across Southern California and remotely nationwide. Every Microsoft 365 audit is read-only.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions about replacing SMS and voice MFA

Is SMS MFA still better than no MFA?

Yes, much better. But it's the weakest MFA method, and Microsoft is retiring its own SMS and voice delivery in 2027, so it's time to move.

When does Microsoft stop sending SMS and voice codes?

Microsoft says February 1, 2027 for most users and July 1, 2027 for Global Administrators and external users. Users whose only method is SMS or voice must then register a passkey to sign in.

What should replace SMS?

A passkey in Microsoft Authenticator for most users, and FIDO2 security keys or Windows Hello for administrators. The Authenticator app is a good step if passkeys aren't ready yet.

Can we keep SMS after 2027?

Only by contracting a third-party telephony provider through the Microsoft Security Store. Most companies are better off moving to passkeys.

What is phishing-resistant MFA?

A method that can't be tricked into signing in on a fake site, such as passkeys, security keys, Windows Hello and certificate-based authentication.

What about users without a smartphone?

Give them a FIDO2 security key. It works on a keyring and doesn't need a phone.

Next step

Move off text-message codes before 2027

Prevent

Microsoft 365 Security Audit

$3,500 fixed

About 200 read-only checks across sign-in protection, MFA strength, admin roles, email, sharing and devices, for any tenant size, with four reports and a remediation roadmap.

Respond

Microsoft 365 & Azure Compromise Investigation

From $3,500

For when an account was taken over despite MFA: we establish how and what the attacker reached.

Want to see the deliverables first? Open the Microsoft 365 audit sample report or browse all our sample reports.

Related reading: How to set up MFA in Microsoft 365 · How to turn on risk-based Conditional Access · How to set up break-glass accounts · Identity, MFA and Conditional Access guide

Sources

Sources used on this page

  1. Microsoft Learn, Passkeys by default and retirement of Microsoft-provided SMS and voice authentication
  2. Microsoft Learn, Frequently asked questions about SMS and voice retirement
  3. Microsoft Learn, What happens when Microsoft-provided SMS and voice retire
  4. Microsoft Learn, Conditional Access authentication strengths
  5. Microsoft Learn, Microsoft Entra authentication overview (phishing-resistant methods)
  6. Microsoft Learn, Passkeys (FIDO2) in Microsoft Entra ID
  7. CISA and FBI, Advisory AA23-320A Scattered Spider
  8. Australian Cyber Security Centre, Scattered Spider advisory (July 2025 update)

This guide is general information, not a guarantee of protection or legal advice. Microsoft changes its admin centers often: menu names and steps were checked against Microsoft Learn on November 20, 2026. Drawings are simplified and are not screenshots of Microsoft products. Sample findings come from fictional companies. Incidents are described as reported by the cited sources; OC Security Audit was not involved in them. Questions? Call 949-777-5567 or email support@ocsecurityaudit.com.